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In 2005, the International Health Regulations were 
adopted at the 58th World Health Assembly; in June 2007, 
they were entered into force for most countries. In 2012, 
the world is approaching a major 5-year milestone in the 
global commitment to ensure national capacities to identify, 
investigate, assess, and respond to public health events. 
In the past 5 years, existing programs have been boosted 
and some new activities relating to International Health 
Regulations provisions have been successfully established. 
The lessons and experience of the past 5 years need to be 
drawn upon to provide improved direction for the future. 
T
hroughout the >60 years that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has been in existence, member 
states have made use of the constitutional provision 
that permits the Health Assembly to adopt regulations 
concerning sanitary and quarantine requirements and 
other procedures designed to prevent the international 
spread of disease (1). In 1951, the ﬁ  rst such regulations, 
the International Sanitary Regulations, were adopted and 
focused on 6 communicable diseases requiring coordinated 
international measures to control their transmission 
between countries (2). By the 1990s, they had been 
amended and renamed the International Health Regulations 
(IHR); their application was reduced to only 3 diseases, 
and they were considered inadequate for addressing the 
increasingly globalized nature of health risks. In 1995, the 
Health Assembly called on the WHO secretariat to develop 
revised regulations that were more relevant to worldwide 
public health challenges (3–5). A process of intensive and 
wide technical consultation was followed by a series of 
intergovernmental negotiations in which WHO member 
states took control of the draft and negotiated additions 
and amendments to every aspect before agreeing to a ﬁ  nal 
version in time for it to be adopted at the 58th Session of 
the Health Assembly (6).
Since entering into force in 2007, the IHR have 
provided a legally binding global framework to support 
national and international programs and activities aimed at 
preventing, protecting against, controlling, and providing 
a public health response to the international spread of 
disease (7). Although the IHR contain articles directed 
toward several facets of public health security, they can be 
broadly summarized into 2 main areas: urgent actions to be 
taken with respect to acutely arising risks to public health 
and strengthening of national systems and infrastructure 
(referred to as core capacities). This article provides an 
overview of selected contributions to these areas made 
during the past 5 years. It is written from the perspective 
of the WHO department charged with coordinating 
implementation of the IHR at WHO global headquarters 
in Geneva and seeks to identify major achievements and 
continuing challenges.
Establishment of National IHR Focal Points 
One of the early demonstrations of global commitment 
to implementation of the IHR has been the successful 
establishment of National Focal Points (NFPs) in all but 1 
of the states parties to the IHR. (States parties to the IHR 
include all WHO member states, the Holy See [an observer 
to the World Health Assembly], and Liechtenstein.) NFPs 
are national centers, not individual persons, that occupy 
a critical role in conducting the communications aspects 
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of the IHR, within their countries and internationally (8). 
They are responsible for proactively notifying WHO of 
relevant health events, responding to WHO secretariat 
requests for event-related information, and ensuring that 
messages and advice from WHO are disseminated to the 
relevant actors within the country. Since 2007, NFPs have 
been increasingly diligent in updating and conﬁ  rming 
their contact details to WHO on an annual basis as 
required by the regulations. NFPs are ofﬁ  cially sanctioned 
to work with WHO on IHR implementation and provide 
feedback to WHO on country needs and concerns for 
this task. Staff members who work in NFPs are a major 
audience for WHO training materials. The engagement of 
NFPs in the scientiﬁ  c evaluation of the IHR notiﬁ  cation 
procedures has indicated that a high proportion of NFPs 
had a good understanding of the notiﬁ  cation procedures 
and had accessed WHO training materials on this issue 
and has indicated that agreement was high in terms of 
events that must be notiﬁ  ed when applying the procedures 
(9). NFPs have access to the contact details of all other 
NFPs through a password-protected website that enables 
direct communication among countries at the NFP 
level. For events that do not require WHO coordination 
(such as routine tracing of contacts for an infectious 
disease associated with international travel), such direct 
communications have been useful.
Not all NFPs are able to function as expected. For 
example, some contact details fail to work for urgent 
communications, some NFPs indicate that procedures for 
round-the-clock communications are not yet established, 
and delays in responding to requests for event information 
often occur. Studies have indicated that NFPs know how 
to assess events under the IHR. Their participation in 
event-related communications is increasing; however, their 
role has been primarily providing ofﬁ   cial and accurate 
information on events that ﬁ   rst gain WHO attention 
through informal sources such as media reports. Among the 
reasons identiﬁ  ed for such less-than-optimal performance 
is that some NFPs lack authority or access to the necessary 
authority, resulting in delays in obtaining clearance for 
communications. Such lack of authority is also identiﬁ  ed 
as a barrier to the effective intersectoral collaboration 
that is envisioned as critical to the NFP role within their 
national situation. Although NFPs generally recognize the 
value of engaging with government sectors outside the 
health ministry, they lack the convening power needed to 
establish solid and reliable linkages.
Pilot Testing of IHR-Implementation Course 
A key WHO objective is to strengthen the human 
resources available to countries to set up and manage 
systems for securing global public health under the IHR 
framework. In partnership with established educational 
institutions, the WHO secretariat has been pilot testing 
an IHR-implementation course, which promotes a global 
harmonized understanding and application of the IHR 
framework.
The IHR-implementation course is for public health 
professionals, mainly those belonging to NFPs but 
also those from other related sectors from national or 
international organizations in public and private sectors. 
The course is delivered over 5 months as on-the-job 
training. The 210 total learning hours consist of 12 weeks 
of distance learning with tutoring and a 6-week break used 
to ﬁ  nalize assignments and prepare for the 2-week face-to-
face session.
The ﬁ  rst 3 pilot IHR-implementation courses have been 
operated by the WHO Department of Global Capacities, 
Alert and Response in collaboration with the University 
of Pretoria, South Africa; Georgetown University Law 
Center, USA; the University of Geneva, Switzerland; and 
Institut Bioforce Développement, France. Implementation 
of the courses involved the contributions of several WHO 
departments: Food Safety, Zoonoses and Foodborne 
Diseases; Protection of the Human Environment; Health 
Action in Crises; and Health Systems and Services. WHO 
Regional Ofﬁ   ces have been mobilized to identify and 
sponsor participants.
The IHR-implementation courses have been delivered 
in English to 89 participants from 57 countries in all 
6 WHO regions. Post-training evaluation of the ﬁ  rst  2 
courses conducted in 2011 indicated that the course 
content was relevant to participants’ work, improved their 
understanding of IHR, and increased their conﬁ  dence when 
dealing with the topic. Competencies developed have been 
put into practice, and material from the course has been re-
used at the national level. The opportunity to engage with 
peers from other countries during and after the course was 
considered especially valuable.
In light of the positive evaluation and continuing 
need, organization of additional courses at the national 
level is planned. A need to provide the course in languages 
other than English requires new institutional partners and 
additional resources. Some of the IHR-implementation 
course contents are being developed into stand-alone 
modules for potential integration into other established 
training opportunities such as ﬁ  eld epidemiology training 
and Masters of Public Health programs.
Monitoring of Progress of IHR National 
Core Capacities 
One of the most substantial obligations introduced by 
the IHR is the commitment of states parties to develop, 
strengthen, and maintain national capacities to identify, 
investigate, assess, and respond to public health events in 
their territories and to develop, strengthen, and maintain 
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routine and emergency public health capacities at certain 
designated points of entry. These obligations were 
introduced in acknowledgment that effective national 
systems are the essential underpinning to any global health 
security and that such systems are the mechanisms needed 
to prevent many public health events from reaching the 
level of international signiﬁ   cance. The IHR capacities 
are described in functional terms in Annex 1, and a major 
milestone toward implementation has been to reach a 
consensus on the scope and technical components that can 
be expected to contribute to the required functionality.
For surveillance and response, the capacities are 
grouped under the following 8 main headings:
• National legislation, policy and ﬁ  nancing







A range of potential health hazards can fall under 
the IHR capacity requirements. These hazards have been 
identiﬁ  ed as infectious, zoonotic, food safety, chemical, 
and radiologic/nuclear.
To help states parties assess their capacity, a monitoring 
framework was developed. The framework represents a 
consensus of technical expert views drawn globally from 
WHO member states, technical institutions, partners, and 
from within WHO. The framework incorporates current 
knowledge and concepts that have been successfully 
used to monitor capacity-development activities. It 
builds on the experts’ knowledge of current capacities of 
states parties, existing regional and country strategies for 
capacity development, and other available resources and 
tools, particularly other tools used for IHR core capacity 
assessment by states parties. Using a checklist of 20 
indicators, the IHR monitoring process assesses status of 
implementation in 8 areas of core capacity, development of 
capacities at points of entry, and development of capacities 
for the IHR-relevant hazards.
An annual questionnaire is used to collect data on the 
core capacities; country responses are stored in a secure 
database at WHO, accessible only to IHR NFPs and 
the secretariat through use of tools that ensure country 
conﬁ   dentiality. The questionnaire is made available in 
several formats, including through the Internet. To ensure 
that the full spectrum of relevant hazards is covered, 
NFPs are advised to lead the process of completing 
the questionnaire, in close collaboration with ofﬁ  cials 
responsible for the various capacity areas and including 
other sectors.
Outputs of the monitoring framework include 
country proﬁ  les for all reporting countries and detailed 
NFP reports on strengths, weakness, and gaps; proﬁ  les for 
the 6 WHO regions; and aggregated global reports for the 
World Health Assembly. This information has enabled 
states parties to measure progress and identify where 
improvements are needed, thereby providing evidence 
for program planning, recommendations, and decision 
making. At the global level, this monitoring information is 
used by the secretariat to comply with the Health Assembly 
request for an annual report on IHR implementation from 
WHO, including information provided by states parties 
and on the secretariat’s activities. Thus, WHO governing 
bodies can take account of the progress when directing 
secretariat activities. The analysis also enables better 
identiﬁ   cation of the priority areas toward which the 
secretariat and other development partners can focus their 
support to countries.
From a total of 194 states parties, the questionnaire 
elicited 128 and 156 responses for 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. Because not all states parties responded to the 
questionnaire, the reports produced might not completely 
reﬂ   ect IHR core capacity development strengths and 
weaknesses at the regional and global levels. Evaluating 
implementation status in nonresponding countries is 
challenging, especially because some of these countries 
face the greatest implementation difﬁ  culties. With the goal 
of improving the validity and consistency of self-reported 
data, several multicountry workshops and trainings have 
been held and standardized data collection and analysis 
tools have been promoted. Such challenges are also being 
addressed by identifying several supplementary information 
sources that might partially reﬂ  ect national IHR capacities 
and including such information in an additional report to 
the 2012 Health Assembly.
The biggest challenge involved in implementing the 
IHR is ensuring that the IHR core capacities are present in 
all countries of the world. Ensuring IHR core capacities is 
also the area in which the IHR have the greatest potential to 
make a major contribution to world health; as the process 
approaches a key 5-year milestone on June 15, 2012, all 
efforts are being refocused on this issue.
Interagency Collaboration for Public 
Health at Points of Entry
Although many IHR provisions address international 
travel and transport and public health activities at points 
of entry (ports, airports, and ground crossings), these have 
not been areas in which WHO or many member states 
had strong preexisting programs. Attention has therefore 
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been focused on leveraging interagency and multisectoral 
collaboration at all levels to achieve the public health 
objectives. For example, the Cooperative Arrangement 
for the Prevention of Spread of Communicable Disease 
through Air Travel project (10) is an initiative of the WHO 
sister agency the International Civil Aviation Organization, 
through which countries can receive support for realizing 
IHR objectives relating to air travel. Other collaborations 
include the International Tourism Response Network (11), 
regional networks such as the Risk Assessment Guidance 
for Infectious Diseases Transmitted on Aircraft project 
(initiated by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control) (12), and the European Commission ship sanitation 
training network  project (13). To facilitate information 
sharing and coordination among authorities responsible for 
health measures and development of IHR core capacities 
at points of entry, WHO supports a specialized network 
for ports, airports, and ground crossings: the PAGnet (14). 
During the 2011 nuclear accident in Japan, the 2010–11 
cholera epidemic in Haiti, and the 2009 inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) 
pandemic, PAGnet offered a communication platform 
to public health ofﬁ   cials at points of entry around the 
world, facilitating timely information sharing on response 
measures that helped avoid overreaction and unnecessary 
barriers to international travel and trade.
Although assessments have shown many IHR 
capacities at certain points of entry in several countries, 
countries differ widely in the levels of capacity, the 
allocation of responsibilities, and the priority given to this 
area of public health. This heterogeneity makes it more 
difﬁ  cult to provide guidance and advice that is relevant to 
the national and local contexts of all ports, airports, and 
ground crossings around the world. Private industry and 
commercial organizations, which involve a variety of 
governmental sectors in addition to health, are key actors 
for the implementation of IHR provisions affecting travel 
and transportation. WHO must use its convening power, its 
neutrality, and its focus on public health objectives to help 
the disparate actors reach consensus.
Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza and Convening of the 
Emergency Committee
Around the world, many IHR provisions are used 
daily. Thus far, however, the full range of provisions 
relating to global emergencies have been applied to only 
1 event: the 2009–2010 inﬂ   uenza pandemic. The IHR 
deﬁ  ne a category of events with the term “public health 
emergency of international concern.” The WHO director-
general follows deﬁ   ned procedures to determine which 
events are so characterized. The key practical outcomes 
of such a determination are the provision of relevant 
information to all states parties, the convening of an IHR 
Emergency Committee to advise the director-general 
regarding the event, and the issuance of IHR temporary 
recommendations. 
The ﬁ  rst IHR Emergency Committee was convened on 
April 25, 2009, to advise the WHO director-general about 
the determination of the ﬁ  rst public health emergency of 
international concern under the IHR. That this ﬁ  rst meeting 
of the Emergency Committee took place by teleconference 
within 48 hours of the decision to convene it demonstrated 
that the procedures established by the IHR could work in 
practice. The continued work of this committee, providing 
advice to the director-general for more than a year, 
demonstrates the commitment of its members to support 
the governments of the world and WHO in their responses 
to the emergency. During the inﬂ  uenza pandemic, the NFP 
network developed much-needed momentum and provided 
early information and situation updates as the virus was 
identiﬁ  ed around the world. The WHO secretariat was able 
to provide updates, announcements, and advice to countries 
through the event information site for NFPs with timing that 
was coordinated with its provision of public information.
The duration of the public health emergency of 
international concern posed several challenges for the 
procedures established for IHR implementation. For 
example, the decision to protect the impartiality of the 
advice given by members of the IHR Emergency Committee 
(by not publishing their names until after their work was 
completed) was not helpful when their work went on for 
more than a year and was under intense media speculation. 
Also, the rules adopted for temporary recommendations 
were designed to allow them for only a limited amount of 
time, which was just barely compatible with the pandemic 
experience. The IHR did not prevent several countries from 
applying restrictive travel- and trade-associated measures 
not recommended by WHO, although several such measures 
were discontinued or modiﬁ   ed after communication 
with the WHO secretariat. The IHR Review Committee 
was concerned by the restrictive measures and provided 
recommendations on how they can be more effectively 
addressed (15).
Establishment of External IHR Review 
The potential to learn lessons from the 2009–2010 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza experience and the need to address 
public concerns regarding the WHO response led to 
the  establishment of the ﬁ  rst IHR Review Committee. 
The remit of this committee was expanded (by the WHO 
Executive Board from a periodic review of the functioning 
of the IHR, as required under IHR Article 54) to include an 
independent, external review of the international response 
to pandemic inﬂ  uenza. Although the secretariat provided 
administrative and logistic support, the committee, under 
the chairmanship of Harvey Fineberg, enjoyed complete 
autonomy in interpreting their mandate, deﬁ  ning  their 
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methods of work, and identifying their evidence. In doing 
so, they followed the requirements of the IHR in ensuring 
states parties the opportunity to observe and engage in 
formal committee meetings. After more than a year, the 
committee delivered its ﬁ   nal report to the 64th Health 
Assembly, at which the approach taken was commended and 
the recommendations were endorsed by the member states. 
Despite ﬁ  ndings that WHO faced systemic difﬁ  culties and 
some shortcomings in addressing the inﬂ  uenza pandemic, 
the committee concluded that the actions taken were 
motivated by public health concerns and found no evidence 
of misconduct. The 15 recommendations in this report have 
gone on to form a major component of the biennial work 
plans of the relevant WHO departments.
The exhaustive work of the IHR Review Committee 
made heavy demands on the time of its expert members 
and on WHO resources. WHO should take advantage of 
the exceptional opportunity to learn from this analysis of 
the pandemic experience.
The IHR allow review committees to give advice 
broadly on the functioning of the regulations, and it can 
be foreseen that in future years, committees will need to 
be convened with markedly different tasks, for example, 
advising on the granting of a second round of extensions 
to the core capacity time frame. At such time, the working 
methods of such a future review committee will need to be 
reassessed to ﬁ  t with its mandated task.
Conclusions
The IHR are a legal tool designed to contribute to the 
achievement of public health goals, in which success is 
seen and measured in improvements to public health rather 
than adherence to any particular article of the document. At 
the same time, given the large number of initiatives for and 
inﬂ  uences on public health outcomes, it will always be hard 
to tease out and identify the speciﬁ  c contributions of such 
an instrument to global health. This article indicates some 
of the direct effects that IHR implementation is having 
on public health practice. Where states and WHO are 
building on preexisting programs, the IHR have boosted 
continuing commitment and momentum. An example at the 
international level is the WHO program for management 
of acute public health events; an example at the country 
level is the program to strengthen capacity in public health 
laboratories. In addition to boosting existing programs, 
some new activities relating to IHR provisions have been 
successfully established, such as the NFP network and the 
Emergency Committee. 
The lessons and experience of the past 5 years need 
to be drawn upon to provide improved direction for the 
future. The member state–driven negotiations provide 
a legacy of ownership and commitment from countries, 
which continues to be evident in the nature and number 
of interventions concerning IHR during meetings of WHO 
governing bodies. As we approach the 5-year target date 
of June 2012, the immediate challenge is for WHO and the 
states parties to live up to the intention of the IHR national 
core capacity requirements and to make the best use of the 
opportunity for countries to continue their efforts beyond 
that date as anticipated under the extension procedure 
provided by the IHR.
Dr Hardiman is team leader within the WHO Department 
of Global Capacities, Alert and Response, which focuses on the 
legal and procedural aspects of IHR implementation. His research 
interests are detection and response to disease outbreaks and 
protection against the international spread of disease.
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